Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees by MacDonald, Dawn
Book Reviews
How wrong we were. In southern Sudan
alone, the refugee count of 2,000 Ugandans
at the time of Amin's exit from power grew
ta 300,000 in the next four years. Even
more startling, only twenty percent of
these numbers obtained correction:
sought and obtained - assistance from the
UNHCR, the central agency co-ordinating
the security and material needs of those in
flight
In the late 1970s, with the name Idi Amin
the current synonym for madman-devil
incarnate, the world's compassionate
cheered the seven-month effort of Tan-
zanian troops to reach Kampala and topple
the despot. And that, for most of us, was
the end of that. If we thought about
Uganda at aIl in the next few years, it was
with complacency. Of course there would
be a time of further displacement for
innocent civilians but it would settle down.
The international humanitarian agencies we
had assigned to do our caring for us would
clean up while we grappled with the news
of horrors elsewhere in the world.
These and thousands of equally arresting
facts have been presented in Dr. Barbara
Harrell-Bond's new book Imposing Aid:
Emergency Assistance to Refugees. But Dr.
Harrell-Bond is concerned with a great deal
more than the facts of this particular
situation. From the outset her case study
approach -- two years of observing and
writing about the reality of the Ugandan
refugees in the Yei River district of
southem Sudan -- was planned ta test aIl
the assumptions underlying the behaviour
and attitudes of those who interact with
African refugees (there are currently
million fleeing terror, civil war and drcm~ht.,c"!.
and the numbers have been predicted to
as high as fifty million by the year
The intervenors include UNHCR
makers and practitioners, the voluntary
govemmental organizations (NGOs)
ta implement UNHCR progra
journalists, visiting delegates from do,',
governments, and hosts, both gov,_,',
mental and local, who are called uP9JJ'r
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These refugees are the Jews of today ... The
good Lord has dealt out a new deck of cards, and
we are the ones who must not be turning them
away now.
Rabbi Joseph Weiznbaum, whose father
was an undocumented alien, adds:
... what is happening to the Central American
refugees parallels the beginnings of Nazism in
Europe.
speaking at a Tucson symposium should be
taken to heart. Rabbi Marshall Meyer,
who spent 25 years in Argentina, stated:
The trials faced by Central American exiles
entering Canada are considerable. But for
many more of their countrymen the
situation is even more grave. There are
approximately two million Central
American refugees. Between 1979 and 1983
more than 50,000 Guatemalans and
250,000 Salvadoreans fled their countries'
U.S.-backed military regimes. According
ta Arthur Helton, Directar of the political
asylum project of the Lawyers Committee
for International Human Rights, a further
one million left their troubled countries in
1984 (Macleans, May 13, 1985). It is
believed that one million Central Ameri-
cans have entered the United States where
most reside illegally trying to elude the
immigration authorities.
We, as concerned Canadians, must apply
pressure on, our government ta continue to
avoid the double error made by the United
States. We must not assume Central
Americans are economic migrants. My data
indicates a downward plunge in economic
status. But the overriding issue is that
Canada, unlike the United States, must
honour ils humanitarian obligations as
signatory 10 the United Nations
Convention and Protocol on refugees.
The Reagan administration insists that
most of the illegal immigrants from
Central America are economic migrants
seeking to escape poverty rather than
political represssion. The study of refugees
in Montreal clearly demonstrates exactly
the opposite.
The United States deported Salvadoreans
and Guatemalans at the rate of 400 each
month in 1984. Many would then face
imprisonment or even death. The United
States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) granted asylum ta only 328
of 13,373 (3%) Salvadorean applicants in
1984.
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Conclusion
Once here, the high persecution group
tended ta have more immigration delays
and problems. Of the 28.6% of Guate-
Malans and 37.4% of Salvadoreans in our
sample who experienced immigration
difficulties -- negative or late decisions,
appeals -- 70% of the Guatemalans and
73.3% of the Salvadoreans were in the high
persecution category. Four out of our 75
respondents were placed in preventive
detention-upon arrivaI.
Dr. Harrell-Bond, an anthropologist, has
made sure that first and foremost we get
beyond the simplistic impressions of just
who the refugees are, as portrayed by their
fund-raising marketers. The cliches paint
the picture of helplessness -- people with
their hands out with no chance for survival
outside the beneficence of the donor world.
Through Dr. Harrell-Bondls meticulous
portrayaIs of the people she worked with
and encountered in survey interviews, we
get ta know real people coping with real
events and situations. In the words of the
refugees themselves we learn the particulars
of terror as children turn into bandits and a
friendls mother hides a bit of cooked
pumpkin she no longer wants ta share. We
leam of people pushed out of their homes
by marauding soldiers on a vengeance tour
of areas and tribal peoples associated with
Aminls regime. Civilians on the ron made
shelters in the countryside. Sometimes
they were pushed further and they made
second and third shelters. Sometimes they
retumed home only to be pushed out again.
Finally they crossed the Sudan border to
seek uneasy asylum. Ugandan soldiers
raided their camps at the borders. As the
refugees pushed further into Sudan territory
they discovered the baleful eye of hosts
who resented their occupation of lands
donated by the Sudanese govemment and
exploited them as cheap labour.
In the midst of all this, the intervention of
international assistance is minimal, inap-
propriate, ultimately a waste of money.
Even for those who do accept assistance, it
is but one branch of the survival strategy.
Refugees, except for those truly helpless or
dependent, are above all resourceful. They
worked for the bad wages. They found
ways to trade. They kept their eyes on the
Ugandan situation in case there was a
chance of resuming normal life at home.
AlI this unfolded in extreme hardship and
fear - and by and large without the
assistance supposedly available to them.
We discover that the very term "refugee" is
meaningless. To both the UNHCR and the
Ugandan, it means settled in a UNHCR agri-
cultural settlement. Eighty percent of the re-
fugees resisted -- often at the point of star-
vation -- such assistance. For many, pro-
fessionals and traders before their troubles
started, lcaming the farm business -- often
without sa much as a hoe - just wasn't the
best bet. For others, the settlement option
implied a stigma, too much loss of
independence. According to the eighty
percent, known as the self-settled by the
UNHCR, a refugee is someone else -- the
person who accepts assistance.
Evcn Dr. Harrcll-Bond was astonishcd at
the ratio betwecn self-settled and settlement
refugees. Her original intention was to
study only the settlcmcnt populations since
only they relatcd ta UNHCR policy and
fund expcnditure. She went to the field
with a fundamcntally linear problcm to
explore: the donor and the recipient and aIl
the folks in betwecn who happen ta be on
that straight line. She even ncglccted ta
include the host countrypersons in this
mode!. Her travel arrangements and aIl
other permissions of access were strictly
through the UNHCR.
But insight and intellectual honesty
directed Dr. Harrell-Bond to a holistic
approach. The problem had ta be seen in
relation ta an its parts and some rela-
tionships between the parts were suddenly
more important than others. The refugees
and their Sudanese hasts were more at the
crux of things than the refugees and their
UNHCR benefactors, for example. Asto-
nishingly, even the Ugandans themselves
had something to leam here: that for
example their singing of hymns of praise
to Geneva was only an irritant to their
Sudanese neighbours.
Even the name of the problem changes
with HarreIl-Bondls thinking. No longer
called "refugee", which describcs but one
part, the problem is about an entire
geographical context in which upheaval is
taking place. Not only do we have
Ugandan refugees of the self-settled and
settlement kind. We also have former
Sudanese refugees retuming from a pro-
longed stay in Uganda following earlier
civil war in the Sudan. Then we have the
other Sudanese in flight, the victims of
drought and famine travelling from the
north of the country. And finally there are
the hapless normal inhabitants of the south-
em Sudan, who without waming or pre-
paration are expected 10 adjust ta aIl this.
The traditional UNHCR tactic has been
categoricaIly linear, focuscd primarily on
the refugees as the target of material
assistance; only secondarily on the host
govemment, and then warily, as the
provider of land accommodation and
protection guarantees for the incomcrs.
Historically, the UNHCR has funded three
solutions to the refugeesl plight:
repatriation, settlement in a third country,
settlement in the host country. In Africa,
the third option unfolds most frequently,
and for a variety of reasons it most often
takes the shape of agricultural settlements.
With self-sufficiency as the ill-defined goal
for the refugees -- it means the point where
the donor tap can be tumed off - agricul-
ture holds the obvious promise of at least
food self-sufficiency. But there are many
other reasons for wanting ta organize the
refugees inta settlements. For one thing,
donors like their recipients ta be visible.
It makes the book-keeping of supplies
(plastic dishes, blankets, hoes) casier.
There are other debated arguments for
settlements: the protection of the refugees
against their raiding countrymen soldiers,
the facilitation of Sudanese sccurity
concems, the minimizing of crime.
But the settlements do not work. They
produce neither agriculture nor self-
sufficiency. The able refugees stay away
from them and they become !ittle welfare
communities of the temporarily and
permanently disabled -- set apart, yet the
most visible indicator of the hardship
shared by aIl. Looked down upon by the
self~settled, envied by the Sudanese locals
who see where aIl the foreign money is
going, they have entered the black hole of
relief aida They are now undifferentiated
statistics to whom are given the so-called
essentials: the shelter, the food ration,
maybe sorne tools and blankets. That there
are endless problems which do not fit this
response -- the nccd to bury onels dead, the
necd for transportation 10 a clinic, severe
psychological trauma, suspicions that
someone is practising witchcraft, ta name a
few -- has no play here. Neither does the
proposition that among the settlement
refugees there could be human resources to
create new solutions, new ways out.
In a word, in this segmentized and artificial
approach, nobody is thinking about the
whole problem -- least of aIl the represen-
tatives of donors. Their assumption of
dominance in the situation belies the possi-
bility of the Most obvious partnership of
aIl, bctwecn themselves and the Sudanese
govemment. But African govemmcnts get
the cold shoulder from humanitarians.
Humanitarians cite incompetence, bad hu-
man rights records, even corruption as
reasons. Apart from the massive arrogance
thcse views represent, humanitarians have
much ta think about in terms of their own
forms of corruption. Harrell-Bond found
instances where relief workers sent spics to
the homes of government .officiais to see if
they could find evidence of unusual spen-
ding. Meanwhile, the do-gooders them-
selves blitllely spend the dollars earmarked
for compassion without even a modicum of
accountability, moving from failure to
fa ilure, often hiring the unqualified just on
the basis of thcir white skin. Problem-
solving always means working with the
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best-qualified available; in the Sudanese
situation, Harrell-Bond found credentiaIs
and will among the Sudanese and Ugandans
just waiting to be recruited.
Why not, asks Harrell-Bond, take the
funding destined exclusively 10 settlements
and malee it a community affair? If the area
as a whole could somehow benefit, refugees
could be looked upon as an opportunity,
rather than a burden. Why try to tum
qualified Ugandan refugees into farmers
when their arrivaI on the scene represents a
positive infusion of training and skills?
But politics, rather than problem-solving,
is the main act here. The settlement, far
from being a safe haven, is a final theatre
wherein the real power struggle between
donors and recipients plays itself out. It
does not sound like much of a struggle.
Dr. Harrell-Bond has opened a doorway
onto immense, new territory. She wants
aIl concerned not only to deal with the real
facts but to fundamentally change the
approach to those facts. In the process,
she challenges every facet of the Western
humanitarian philosophy. The idea, for
example, that the act of "giving" -- forget
for the moment that the actual givers are
paid, often well-paid - is a thing in itself,
somehow beyond the usual standards of
professionalism, beyond criticism, certain-
ly on the part of the recipient Or the idea
that the humanitarian cause is apolitical,
outside the ongoing dramas of local,
national and international politics that is
otherwise the context of the crises in need
of aid intervention. Myth after myth
explodes in Harrell-Bond's exploration. No
one will read this book without twisting
and tuming upon their own preconceptions.
Doing good, according ta these new
rigours, is not the easiest but the hardest
thing in the world 10 do weIl. Not doing it
well, worse, pretending to do it weIl, is a
special fonn of evil.
Western humanitarianism surely rates in Dr.
Harrell-Bond's system as one of the worst
of political evils confronting the besieged
refugee. Too often, the badge of com-
passion is used to disguise thoughtless-
ness, petty politics and sheer incompe-
tence. While the donor world goes about its
business, assuming that its conduits of in-
ternational caring (the relief workers) are
spending the money entrusted 10 them
properly and solving the problems of the
suffering, the job is simply not getting
done and nobody - at least not until Dr.
Harrell-Bond arrived on the scene - is
asking the fundamental questions.
Why DOt, Harrell-Bond asked herself on
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several occasions during previous years of
field study in Africa, where nine times out
of ten she discovered failure?
Harrell-Bond discovered that often behind
the humanitarian piety is a pernicious will
to keep critical observers out. In forty
years of relief agency histary, the practice
of impregnability has become a fine art.
Joumalists are encouraged to coyer situa-
tions that will enhance fund-raising, but
the do-gooders generally avoid public
analysis of their situations and activities
and they go to great lengths to curtail
journalistic access ta information.
No doubt similar strictures apply to
academic research, but, writes Robert
Chambers in his foreword 10 Imposing Aid,
academics have complied ta the
disinfonnation process by only belatedly
seeing refugee studies as a proper area for
serious research -- and then only with an
urban, elite bias which does not apply to
rural Africa where Most of the refugee
action is. African refugees remain stereo-
typed as an uneducated, undifferentiated
masSa Far from being seen as a set of
individuals with endless differences ta be
attended to, the African refugees are
regarded as not quite human, especially in
their threshold for suffering, which too
many have assumed is much higher than
that of non-Africans.
Harrell-Bond's breakthrough volume (in
Chambers' view, it is the first of its kind)
required two six-month-periods in the field
each of the two years, first concentrating
on the observation of aIl sorts of outside
intervenors, the relief workers, the mem-
bers of international donor delegations, and
the joumalists. She watched the inter-
actions of the outsiders and ultimately the
effect of all this on the plight of the
refugees.
Even short visits from the outside can have
major impact. UNHCR was under pressure
to provide ambulances to one district after
an advisor of President Reagan had watched
patients being carried to the clinic in
wheelbarrows. On the other hand, the stick
handling applied to journalists keeps them
from confronting their own stereotypieal
thinking and they end up writing the same
old simplistic doggerel.
Harrell-Bond arrived in the Sudan with
model criteria forged a few years previously
as a result of a study she did for Oxfam on
Sahrawi refugees in Algeria. According ta
her report published in 1981, Algeria had
permitted the Sahrawi complete autonomy
in the areas they had settled. The camps
still relied on capital infusions from the
donor community but their success in
mobilizing the personal resources of the
refugees had much to do with the fact that
no outsiders lived or worked in the refugee
areas. The fundamental idea of participa-
tion at work in Aigeria became the central
core for this book: the critical search for
anti-participation attitudes, the subtle and
not so subtle ways the powerful employ ta
control the behaviour of the powerless.
These attitudes thrive in the demi-worlds of
refugee camps and according ta Harrell-
Bond, they are not only unfair but also
expensive, ineffective and wasteful.
With anti-participation cornes the
imposition of aid, a one-way street which
neglects the concems of the hosts, the
govemment officiaIs and local folk who
have been told to share their reality with
strangers. In addition, the creative
energies of the refugee are suppressed and
far too often the end results provoke
unnecessary hostilities in all directions.
One aches throughout Dr. Harrell-Bond's
description of failure in the Sudan UNHCR
operation for the mitigating character or
instance that would have been a sign of
hope, a direction for the future, a positive
demonstration of how things could be.
William Shawcross in his prize-winning
The Quality of Mercy, a description of
refugee operations on behalf of post-Pol
Pot Cambodians, provided examples of
competence and even heroism ta soften his
black picture of disorganized and deceitful
humanitarians. But while Harrell-Bond
graciously acknowledges UNHCR officiaIs
for their support of her independently
funded study, adding that the field operation
she visited in southern Sudan was among
the best of aIl such programmes, the reader
will find few further positives in Dr. Harrell-
Bond's observations.
Dr. Harrell-Bond has offered so much in
this effort -- with Imposing Aid she has
pointed the way ta new generations who
will now hopefully take up the challenge of
refugee research and studies -- it seems
greedy to ask for more. But in future
volumes, more about the institution of the
UNHCR itself, its history, its leading
personalities, particularly as pertaining to
Africa, would be helpful. We should also
know how much the Sudanese operation
costs, as well as the operational costs of
the other UNHCR activities in Africa.
And then there is the question of Or.
Harrell-Bond's writing style which has not
quite kept up with the parts-whole method
of examination she uses. In the end, the
gestalt comes through, but since she is in
the business of creating new roles, her
